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The University of Arkansas, Department of Education Reform (EDRE) working paper series is intended 
to widely disseminate and make easily accessible the results of EDRE faculty and students’ latest 
findings. The Working Papers in this series have not undergone peer review or been edited by the 
University of Arkansas. The working papers are widely available, to encourage discussion and input from 
the research community before publication in a formal, peer reviewed journal. Unless otherwise indicated, 
working papers can be cited without permission of the author so long as the source is clearly referred to as 
an EDRE working paper.  
ABSTRACT  
Charter schools can have their charters rescinded if they fail to meet performance metrics, which 
are often specified in the charter. In some states, however, charters must meet inflexible, 
standardized  performance standards to survive. Through the lens of public choice theory, we 
hypothesize that charters that were established by African Americans and those which serve 
more African American students are more likely to close, and that state-imposed standardized 
closure rules exacerbate these inequities. Analyses using charter petitions (n=925) and National 
Center for Education Statistics data since 2010 (n=5,548), tend to confirm hypotheses: The 
percentage of African American students and having an African American founder were 
associated with charter school closure. Moreover, automatic standardized closure criteria 




Inherent to the charter school innovation is the explicit bargain that in exchange for substantial 
autonomy, charter schools which fail to succeed will face closure, providing strong incentives for 
successful outcomes in serving students (Hassel, 1999). Many charter schools do in fact close, 
though this itself poses issues regarding racial inequity. Paino, Boylan and Renzulli (2017) report 
that from 1994 to 2005, 1-4% of charter schools closed each year (n=416), with 78% doing so in 
their first four years after opening. Controlling for variables including school age, size, measured 
achievement, and free and reduced lunch percentage of students, they find no relationship with 
the percentage of Hispanic and white enrollment, but that a 1% increase in African American 
enrollment is associated with a 1% increase in the likelihood of closure. Controlling for age, 
region, and urbanicity, an 80% African American school would have a roughly 4.6% annual 
likelihood of closure, compared to roughly 2.3% for an 80% white school. This research does not 
consider the race of the charter school founder as a predictor of school closure, nor probe 
potential interaction between race and regulatory policy environment. Both merit consideration, 
especially given research finding that African American operators are less likely to be awarded 
charters, particularly where the regulatory barriers to receiving a charter are high (Kingsbury, 
Maranto & Karns, 2020).  
 
Here, using data from the Elementary/Secondary Information System (ElSi), a National Center 
for Education Statistics (NCES) web application, as well as successful (i.e. accepted) petitions to 
open charter schools submitted between 2010-2020, we can provide better understanding of 
whether charter schools that were founded by African Americans or serve a greater percentage  
of African American students are more likely to close, and specifically whether the regulatory 
barriers that disparately preclude market entry also disproportionately predict market exit. As 
detailed below, the data do in fact indicate that charter schools started by African Americans and 
serving relatively more African Americans are more likely to close, particularly in states with 




An enormous literature details multifaceted racial inequities in public schools. Prior work 
explores a wide range of phenomena including student discipline, student attainment and 
achievement, and even hiring and promotion into school leadership (works within Milner & 
Lomotoy, 2014; Carroll, Cheng, Maranto & Teodoro, In Press). Importantly, policymakers 
created charter schools in part to empower teachers (Maranto, 2015) and to serve marginalized 
ethnic communities (works in Fox and Buchanan, 2014), but even more to close “achievement 
gaps” as measured by test scores, particularly for African American and Latinx students 
(Thernstrom & Thernstrom, 2003). Quantitative evidence indicates that certain charter schools 
have succeeded in closing achievement gaps (Cheng, Hitt, Kisida & Mills, 2017), though 
researchers have questioned the means used (Golann, 2015), and whether mere increases in test 
scores have substantial positive long term impacts on student success (Ladner, 2018). An 
additional literature offers widely contested findings regarding non-academic impacts from 
market-based approaches to public schooling, including increased use of charter schooling. For 
example, former Chicago Public Schools CEO and U.S. Secretary of Education Arne Duncan 
(2018) argues that closing low performing urban schools and replacing those schools with 
charter schools or other public school options has short-term costs to students and their 
communities, but offers long term benefits by improving human capital among the least well off, 
offering the most disadvantaged students greater opportunities. In contrast, Morel (2018) 
contends that closing district schools and replacing them with charter schools politically 
disempowers communities of color and reduces public employment of African American 
education professionals. In short, the impacts of charter schooling on racial equity involve 
complex, intellectually contested terrain. 
 
An important, but less examined aspect of neoliberal education reform begins with the reality 
that it is not only traditional public schools which close after failing to meet specified criteria. A 
small, but important literature examines charter school opening and closing, processes which are 
indeed central to the charter school model, which proposes autonomy in exchange for 
accountability, the possibility of closure if charters fail to show financial viability, abide by the 
terms of their charter, and serve students academically and otherwise in ways specified by state 
laws and the conditions under which public bodies granted the charters. Market accountability is 
one part of this: if a school fails to please, parents may leave for other options, closing a school 
by voting with their feet. Yet charter schools also face administrative accountability, disciplinary 
or closure decisions made by the public bodies such as school boards and state departments of 
education which granted their charter. In practice administrative accountability may involve 
highly detailed rulemaking and complex administrative judgements on the part of regulators 
regarding whether performance is adequate (Hassel, 1999; Maranto, 2015). In practice such 
decisions, like charter authorization decisions, may reflect the biases of regulators. There is 
indeed a longstanding literature regarding how regulation has systematically disadvantaged 
African Americans in housing (Massey & Denton, 1998), professional licensure and employment 
(Dorsey, 1983; Friedman, 1962), and civil service employment (King, 1995). More recently, 
some have applied insights from these areas to the provision of charter schools.    
 
While factors including financial stability and academic performance influence charter school 
approval and survival, research also finds empirical evidence of discrimination in policy-making 
systems. Using a Critical Race Theory approach to study the charter authorizing process in post-
Katrina New Orleans, Henry (2021) argues that a charter authorizing process ostensibly 
engineered as “neutral, benign, and objective” is in fact a gatekeeping mechanism that tends to 
privilege elites and punish people of color. Some African American charter entrepreneurs have 
echoed these concerns. The African American Charter Schools Coalition formed in Philadelphia 
in 2020, their mission predicated on the observation that Black-led charters face greater obstacles 
regarding oversight, expansion, and renewal (Graham, 2020).  
 
Regarding charter school closing, studying Florida charter schools, Jameson (2017) finds that 
measured school academic performance, age, and size all correlate negatively with the likelihood 
of closure: in short newer, lower performing, and smaller charters are more likely to close. 
Roughly in accord with these findings, coding charter applications from eight states and New 
Orleans in the 2010-18 period, Kingsbury, Maranto and Karns (2020) find that charter schools 
associated with charter management organizations, which are more often led by whites, are less 
likely to close. Comparing the large and lightly regulated Arizona charter sector to comparable 
traditional public schools, Milliman (2016) finds that lower academic performance increases the 
likelihood that charters will close, while having no impact on other public schools. Milliman 
does not explore the impacts of race. In contrast to Milliman, in a quantitative and qualitative 
study of North Carolina charter school closures, Paino, Renzulli, Boylan and Bradley (2014) find 
evidence that market (parent exit), financial, and administrative/bureaucratic factors influence 
closing; academic results do not have direct impacts. Similarly, in their study of Ohio charter 
schools, Gilblom and Sang (2019) find little statistical evidence that measured academic 
achievement affects the likelihood of charter closure, but considerable evidence that integrated 
schools are more likely to survive while predominately white and predominately African 
American schools are more likely to close. Also studying the Ohio charter market, though over a 
different time period, Carlson and Lavertu (2016) find evidence that mandatory closures of low 
performing charter schools in Ohio led to modest improvement in charter school academic value 
added over time, as Duncan (2018) indicated regarding closings of low performing district 
schools in Chicago.   
 
Here, we build on prior research regarding the role of race and regulation in shaping charter 
school markets, to test four hypotheses regarding disparate impacts of charter school closing on 
under-represented communities.    
 
H1: The proportion of African American students in a charter school will be positively related to 
charter school closure.  
 
H2: In states with automatic charter closing provisions when achievement goals are not met, 
schools serving larger percentages of African American students will be relatively more likely to 
close. 
 
H3: Charter schools started by African American educational entrepreneurs will be relatively 
more likely to close than those started by other educational entrepreneurs.  
 
H4: In states with automatic charter closing provisions when achievement goals are not met, 





Testing our hypotheses requires data about which charter schools closed, the student 
demographics of charters schools, and the race of the charter school founder. The first two 
variables are available through the Elementary/Secondary Information System (ElSi), a National 
Center for Education Statistics (NCES) web application. Notably, ElSi does not provide 
information about why certain charter schools closed, but rather the timeframe in which they 
operated or ceased operating. Ideally, we would be able to disentangle the precise reason why a 
charter ceased operations--- whether it comes about from charter revocation, voluntary closure, 
transition into a traditional public school or some other factor---to bring greater clarity to our 
analyses. This is a limitation in that we lack data to determine whether closings reflect market or 
regulatory accountability. Policymakers like Keegan (2001) and academics like Maranto (2015) 
and Yancey (2000) suggest that that regulatory warnings or sanctions may reduce enrollment 
from parents, suggesting interactions between the two processes. Nevertheless, whether a 
cessation of operations is a market sanction (i.e. low enrollment or financial mismanagement) or 
was imposed by external public authorities, the data can test our hypotheses.  
 
Identifying the race of the charter school founder is less straightforward. We code the race of the 
“contact person” identified on the petition originally submitted for charter authorization. The 
“contact person” (henceforth, founder) is likely the most deeply involved of the founding 
members, and their race serves a reasonable proxy for the composition of the founding group 
(Kingsbury, Maranto & Karns, 2020).1 Charter school petitions do not identify the racial identity 
of the founder. We code race by performing an internet search of the name of the founder---
along with their affiliated charter school or other details identified in the petition (e.g. place of 
residence or occupation)---and then use our best judgement to identify their racial classification. 
McCormick et al. (2015, p. 393) conclude that such practices tend to deliver accurate results, and 
that social scientists should consider social media “as a valuable source of demographic 
information to answer relevant social science questions.”  
 
Charter school petitions are not publicly housed in one domain. Rather, custody of records varies 
from state to state, and typically from authorizer to authorizer. To access as many records as 
possible, we collected all publicly available records of charter schools that opened between 
2010-2020.2 In states with charter school laws that did not make records publicly available, we 
contacted the state charter agency to request records of charters opened between 2010 and 2020, 
and then issued official public record requests if our informal request went unanswered. A 
summary of where the charter petitions were collected from is available in Table One. Several 
requests were denied, and we therefore do not have petitions from all states with charter schools. 
Moreover, because custody varies by authorizer, the petitions we received are typically not the 
universe of successful petitions submitted in that state, but the ones submitted to a particular 




                                                          
1 Notably, the degree to which the race of the “main contact” reflects the demographics of the founding entity becomes obscured 
when the individual is affiliated with an education management organization (EMO) or charter management organization (CMO), 
which can be large, dynamic organizations that employ hundreds of staff. Affiliation with an EMO or CMO is not systematically 
recorded on charter school petitions or in any publicly available dataset, so we do not code this information. Our inability to 
control for this variable could increase the likelihood of a type II error.  
2 We limit the sample to these years due to our supposition that earlier records might not be digitized or readily accessible.  
 
Table One: Charter Petitions by State and Means Collected 
State Petitions 
Collected 
How Petitions were Procured 
AR 39 Publicly available 
AZ 70 Publicly available 
CT 6 Shared upon request 
CO 51 Received through public records request 
DE 9 Publicly available 
FL 180 Publicly available 
GA 26 Shared upon request 
ID 26 Shared upon request 
IN 25 Publicly available 
LA 22 Shared upon request 
MA 27 Publicly available 
MO 8 Publicly available 
NC 92 Publicly available 
NJ 16 Shared upon request 
NM 23 Publicly available 
NV 3 Shared upon request 
NY 146 Publicly available 
OH 10 Publicly available 
OK 19 Publicly available 
OR 5 Shared upon request 
PA 30 Received through public records request 
RI 8 Shared upon request 
SC 68 Received through public records request 




Hypotheses 1 and 2 use data from ElSi. Therefore, to test these hypotheses, we use data that 
encompasses all charter schools that were opened between 2010-11 and 2018-19, the most recent 
year for which ElSi provides data. We treat schools operating as charters in that year as open, 
whereas we consider schools opened in 2010-11 or thereafter but closed or operating as 
traditional public schools (i.e. charter to district conversions) in 2018-19 as closed.  
 
Descriptive statistics (Table Two) lend support to our hypotheses. Among majority Black3 
charter schools, 604 of 1,894 (31.9%) closed. Among all other charter schools, 900 of 4,058 
(22.2%) closed. Moreover, automatic closure appears to impact schools differently depending 
upon their racial composition. In states with automatic closure, 416 of 1,120 (37.1%) charters 
that served a majority Black student body closed, compared to just 196 of 1,413 (13.9%) of other 
                                                          
3 For this and other analysis that uses student demographics, we use ElSi data to calculate the average proportion of 
African American enrollment during the time period beginning in 2010-11 and ending 2018-19.  
charters. By comparison, majority-Black charters in states without automatic closure were 2.3 
percentage points less likely to close compared to all other schools (24.3% to 26.6%).  
 
Table Two: Charter Closure Rates by Student Racial Composition and Automatic Closure4 
Student 
Demographics 
Number and % of 
Charters that Closed 
Number % of Charters 
that Closed in States With 
Automatic Closure 
Number % of Charters that 
Closed in States Without 
Automatic Closure 













In our fully specified linear probability model5 we express closure as a function of the proportion 
of African American students, automatic closure, and an interaction between those two terms, as 
well as year opened fixed effects, formally: 
 
 Y= β1AASharei + β2AutoClosureit + β3AASharei*AutoClosureit + β4 YearOpenedi + εit 
 
In this and subsequent models, we include a state fixed effect when automatic closure is not 
featured as an explanatory variable, but omit it if automatic closure is featured. Given the high 
degree of collinearity between the two variables, the inclusion of both variables makes 
interpretation of the automatic closure variable challenging.6  
 
Table Three: Racial Composition and Closure Regression Estimates7 
 I II  








Automatic Closure - -.1346*** (.0117) 
-.2779*** 
(.0148) 




- - .0047*** (.0003) 
Year Opened Fixed Effect Y Y Y 
State Fixed Effect Y N N 
                                                          
4 Observations from states with automatic closure are categorized as “without automatic closure” if they were closed 
before the automatic closure provision was enacted.  
5 ElSi tables specifically denote whether a school has ceased operations. For reasons unclear, sometimes ElSi reports 
zero enrollment during years in which the school is reported to be operating, although the estimates generally return 
to a non-zero number after one year. As a sensitivity test, we omitted schools reporting zero enrollment during 2018-
19 from the analysis. None of the estimates change in practical terms, and none change in terms of statistical 
significance.  
6 As a sensitivity test, we check how inclusion of both state FE and automatic closure impacts our estimates. The 
impact of the proportion of African American students changes appreciably in model II, increasing from .0003 to 
.0019 (p=.01). In model III, the coefficient for that variable becomes positive (.0012) and remains statistically 
significant (p=.01). All told, the models affirm our hypothesis about a disparate impact from automatic closure, 
although they indicate that all charters are penalized for enrolling more African American students.  
7 Regression estimates utilize robust standard errors.  
Obs. 5,458 5,458 5,458 
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01. 
 
Regression results (Table Three) support our hypotheses. Among all states, a one percent 
increase in the share of African American students is associated with a .19% increase in the 
likelihood of closure after controlling for year opened and state in which the charter school 
operates. In the fully specified model, a one percent increase in African American students is 
associated with a .23% decrease in the likelihood of closure in states without automatic closure. 
However, in states with automatic closure, a one percent increase in African American students 
is associated with a .47% relative increase in the likelihood of closure, all else equal. 
Illustratively, the estimates indicate that a charter school in which 30% of the student body is 
African American has a 6.9% lower likelihood of closure compared to a school with no African 
American students if the school is in a state without automatic closure. However, if the 30% 
African American school is in a state with automatic closure, the school has a 7.2% greater 
likelihood of closing compared to the school with no African American students.  
 
Hypotheses 3 and 4 require us to utilize the dataset that we constructed through soliciting charter 
school petitions and coding the race of the main point of contact. Unadjusted differences (Table 
Four) hint at the possibility that automatic closure is more punitive to Black charter 
entrepreneurs than to others. Among schools started by African American charter leaders in 
states that utilize automatic closure criterion, 51.1% closed compared to just 20.4% of charters 
founded by others. The incidence of closure is also greater among African American 
entrepreneurs in states that do not utilize automatic closure criterion, but the difference is 
substantially less pronounced; Among charters founded by African American leaders in states 
that do not utilize automatic closure, 20.7% of charters closed compared to 11.5% of charters not 
founded by African Americans.   
 
 
Table Four: Charter Closures by Race and Automatic Closure8 
Point of Contact Number and % of 
Charters that Closed 
Number % of Charters 
that Closed in States 
With Automatic Closure 
Number % of Charters that 
Closed in States Without 
Automatic Closure 














To obtain linear probability estimates we express closure as a function of the race of the founder 
and other characteristics, formally: 
 
Y= β1AACharterEntrepeneuri + β2AutoClosureit + β3AACharterEntrepeneuri*AutoClosureit + 
β4AAStudentSharei+ β5AAStudentSharei*AutoClosureit + β6 YearOpenedi + εit 
 
                                                          
8 Observations from states with automatic closure are categorized as “without automatic closure” if they were closed 
before the automatic closure provision was enacted. 
Though we already assessed the correlation between student racial composition and closure, we 
include them in certain iterations of this model. African American charter entrepreneurs are more 
likely to serve African American students (r=.49), so the inclusion of both variables is important 
to understand which variable, if either, is driving any observed effect.  
 
Once again, we omit the state fixed effect from models that include automatic closure, as their 
inclusion makes it challenging to interpret the automatic closure coefficient.9  
 
Linear probability estimates support our hypotheses that charter schools started by African 
American charter entrepreneurs are relatively more likely to close than those started by other 
charter entrepreneurs, and that they are disproportionately impacted by automatic closure 
mandates. Specifically, after controlling for state and year opened, charters with African 
American founders are 18.1% more likely to close compared to others. Estimates also support 
our hypothesis that African American founders are disparately impacted by automatic closure. 
Compared to states and time periods without automatic closure, African American founded 
charters are 19.8% more likely to close after controlling for whether the founder is African 
American, automatic closure, and year opened.  
 
Table Five: Founder Race and Closure Regression Estimates  
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Year Opened Fixed 
Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y 
State Fixed Effect Y N N N N Y N N N Y 
Obs. 767 767 767 649 649 717 717 717 649 649 
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01. 
 
Insofar as student and founder demographics are correlated, regression analysis indicates that 
both factors independently predict closure, although the finding is sensitive to model 
specification. Moreover, the estimates generally affirm that automatic closure disparately 
impacts both Black founders and schools that serve a larger share of African American students 
                                                          
9 As a sensitivity test, we included state fixed effects in all models to observe how it effects our variables of interest. 
Several variables of interest gain in statistical significance, and none change in direction. The interaction term in 
column VIII is the only one to show a weaker association; it drops to 90% statistically significant.  
even when accounting for the other variable. For reasons unclear, the only model iteration in 
which automatic closure does not impose disparate impacts according to student and founder 
demographics is when both variables are interacted with the automatic closure variable.  
 
DISCUSSION 
Linear probability estimates support our four hypotheses. Charter schools are more likely to 
close when they educate more African American students and more likely to close when they 
were founded by an African American charter entrepreneur. Moreover, automatic closure 
mandates appear to disparately impact charter schools that serve more African American 
students or those founded by an African American charter entrepreneur.  
 
Notably, recent research (Kingsbury, Maranto & Karns, 2020) indicates that African American 
charter leaders are less likely to be affiliated with charter management organizations or education 
management organizations compared to other charter leaders. Information about association with 
an EMO or CMO were not systematically or consistently recorded in the charter petitions that we 
accessed, so we cannot conclude to what degree that might explain the higher incidence of 
closure or disparate effect from automatic closure laws. Given that EMOs and CMOs have 
expertise in navigating state charter laws and regulations, it is plausible that schools affiliated 
with them are less likely to be closed down, and that this phenomenon may help explain the 
greater incidence of closure among charters founded by African Americans.  
 
Regardless of underlying cause, our observations about how student and founder demographics 
predict charter school closure should raise alarm among policymakers and advocates. For those 
who intrinsically value charter schools as institutions authentically rooted in and empowering the 
communities they serve, our findings---in conjunction with the observation that African 
Americans are disproportionately denied charters in the first place---raise concern about the 
degree to which charter schooling has strayed from its original mission. For those who view 
charter schools as a means to better outcomes rather an end unto themselves, our findings raise 
questions about whether charter school closures---especially those caused by automatic closure 
laws---benefit the students they serve. Concerns are elevated by the fact that African American 
staff tend to benefit African American students, often in ways not detected by test scores 
(Kingsbury, Maranto & Karns, 2020; works in Milner & Lomotey, 2014). In the same vein, 
perhaps charters founded by African American charter entrepreneurs benefit African American 
students in ways not detected by test scores.  
 
Our findings also invite fresh deliberation about the merits of automatic charter closure laws. As 
of 2011, approximately 1 in 5 charters that close do so because they fail to meet performance 
benchmarks (Consoletti, 2011). The topic of automatic closure laws is contentious even among 
pro-charter organizations, as it exposes a rift between the “market model” and “regulatory 
model” of charter schooling (Hess, 2004). The National Association for Charter School 
Authorizers “encourages states to establish in statute a process for automatic closure of 
underperforming charter schools” (NACSA, n.d.). The National Alliance for Public Charter 
Schools echoes that sentiment (Ziebarth, 2015), whereas the Center for Education Reform posits 
that foot voting by parents should ultimately arbitrate questions of school quality (Consoletti, 
2011). Overall, the evidence base to support their differing positions is mixed. On one hand, a 
study in Ohio indicated that charter school students academically benefited in math when their 
schools are shuttered due to mandatory closure laws (Carlson & Lavertu, 2016). On the other 
hand, a national study indicates that more stringent charter regulatory regimes are not predictive 
of stronger achievement on National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) exams (Wolf 
et al., 2021).  
 
Clearly, this is an area on which more research is needed, so that policy-makers can make better 
informed choices regarding how to best balance possible tradeoffs between two values 
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